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HIS Article discusses legislative and judicial developments relat-
ing to Texas law on intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts,
and other estate planning matters during the Survey period of Oc-
tober 1, 2006 through September 30, 2007. Not all newly enacted statutes
and decided cases during the Survey period are presented, and not all
aspects of each cited statute and case are analyzed. You must read and
study the full text of each statute and case before relying on it or using it
as precedent. The discussion of most cases includes a moral that is the
important lesson to be learned from the case. By recognizing situations
that have resulted in time consuming and costly litigation in the past, the
reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of the same situations arising
with his or her clients.
I. INTESTACY
A. DISQUALIFICATION OF "BAD" PARENT
Under certain circumstances, a "bad" parent will not be able to inherit
from his or her minor child-or in some cases, from any minor child-
under new Texas Probate Code section 41(e)-(f).1 Four conditions must
be satisfied before the disinheritance occurs by constructively treating the
parent as predeceasing the child. First, even if all of the conditions of
disinheritance are met, the disinheritance is not automatic; it must be de-
clared by the court.2 Second, if the child lives until age eighteen, disin-
1. See Act of May 27, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1412, § 2, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4855,
4856 (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(e)-(f) (Vernon Supp. 2008)) (apply-
ing only to an intestate who dies on or after September 1, 2007).
2. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(e) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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heritance does not occur regardless of the parent's bad acts. 3 The reason
underlying this condition is that once the child reaches age eighteen, the
child may write a will. Third, the parent must have committed an "evil
act" described in the statute, such as (a) voluntarily abandoning and fail-
ing to support the child in accordance with the parent's obligation or abil-
ity for at least three years before the child's death while having failed to
resume support by time of the child's death; (b) voluntarily and with
knowledge of the pregnancy, abandoning the mother before birth of the
child, failing to provide adequate support or medical care for the mother
during the period of abandonment, and remaining apart from and failing
to support the child since birth; or (c) being criminally responsible for
death or serious injury to "a" child according to a laundry list of penal
statutes.4 Fourth, the "evil acts" must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.5
Although these amendments are based on the sound public policy of
preventing a wicked person from benefiting from his or her evil deeds,
they raise many problems. First, it is arguable that the portion of the new
provision causing disinheritance for certain convictions is unconstitu-
tional because article I, section 21 of the Texas Constitution provides that
"[n]o conviction shall work.. . forfeiture of estate."'6 Texas does not have
a slayer statute applicable to an intestate heir or will beneficiary who
murders the decedent to accelerate receiving the property. Instead,
Texas courts prevent unjust enrichment by imposing a constructive trust
so that title to the ill-gotten property actually passes to the murderer, who
then holds the property as a constructive trustee for the individuals who
are rightfully entitled to it.7 On May 30, 2008, the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral issued a ruling indicating that Texas courts would likely find that sec-
tion 41(e)(3) is unconstitutional.8
Second, the new provisions may be too narrow in scope because dis-
qualification occurs only if the bad acts are done by a parent. Thus, if
another heir such as a grandparent or sibling engages in the evil acts, the
heir may still be able to inherit.
Third, the amendments may be too broad. Texas Probate Code section
41(e)(3) references "a child," not "the child" like section 41(e)(1)-(2). 9
Accordingly, a person could be precluded from inheriting from a child for
conduct that did not involve the intestate child.
3. See id.
4. See id. § 41(e)(1)-(3).
5. Id. § 41(e).
6. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 21.
7. See Pritchett v. Henry, 287 S.W.2d 546, 550-51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
8. Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. GA-0632 (2008).
9. Compare TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(e)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2008), with TEX.




In attempting to show economic contribution when computing intes-
tate shares, Rogers v. Foxworth1 ° serves as an important reminder to pre-
sent evidence of the increase in value due to the contribution. After their
father's death, Rogers' daughters claimed economic contribution from
their step-mother for the contributions their father made to her separate
property-which included a house and a teacher-retirement account
based on Texas Family Code section 3.403. These contributions would
enhance the daughters' intestate share because they are entitled to all of
their father's one-half interest in the community property under Texas
Probate Code section 45.
The appellate court denied the daughters' claim against the house be-
cause they failed to show that the house increased in value as a result of
the economic contributions." Although the daughters were able to show
that community property was used to reduce the balance owed on their
step-mother's house, the evidence needed to show that the increased net




As of September 1, 2007, Texans may no longer make nuncupative
(oral) wills of personal property under the very limited circumstances
previously allowed by sections 64-65 of the Texas Probate Code.13
B. DIVORCE
Prior to the 2007 amendments to Probate Code section 69, only will
provisions in favor of the ex-spouse were read as if the ex-spouse prede-
ceased the testator. 14 This gave rise to two problems.
1. Gifts conditioned on survival
Assume that Harry's will contained the following provision: "I leave
$100,000 to Wanda, my wife. If she does not survive me, I leave this
$100,000 to Sammy, my son. I leave the remainder of my estate to the
American Red Cross." Harry and Wanda then divorced, and Harry died
without changing his will.
The gift to Wanda is read as if she predeceased Harry so she does not
receive the legacy. However, the condition on Sammy's gift that Wanda
10. 214 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, no pet.).
11. Id. at 199.
12. Id. at 198-99.
13. Act of Mar. 17, 1955, 54th Leg., R.S., ch. 55, §§ 64-65, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 88, 109,
repealed by Act of May 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 5.05, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws
4000, 4005.
14. See In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917-18 (Tex. 2007).
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not survive Harry is not satisfied. Thus, Sammy would not receive the
legacy, which would instead pass to the American Red Cross.
Section 69 solves this problem by providing that "all provisions in the
will ... shall be read as if the former spouse . . . failed to survive the
testator."'1 5 Therefore, Sammy now receives the legacy.
2. Gifts to other ex-relatives
Assume that Harry's will contained the following provision: "I leave
$100,000 to Wanda, my wife. I leave another $100,000 to her son, my
step-son, Sammy. I leave the remainder of my estate to the American
Red Cross."
Although Wanda's gift would not have been effective under prior law,
Sammy would still have received his legacy. Section 69 now addresses
this problem by providing that the will is "read as if the former spouse
and each relative of the former spouse who is not a relative of the testator
failed to survive the testator. ' '16 Accordingly, other ex-relatives (step-
children, parents-in-law, etc.) will not continue to be beneficiaries after a
divorce.
C. AMBIGUITY
The importance of careful drafting to describe specific gifts is demon-
strated by In re Estate of Bean,17 a case in which the testatrix's will de-
vised "the eighty (80) acres I own in the J. Bennett Survey" to the
devisee. When the testatrix died, she owned two interests potentially
covered by this devise: a surface estate of 77.83 acres and an undivided
mineral estate of 85.1 acres. Both of these interests were only partly con-
tained within the Bennett Survey. A dispute arose regarding whether
these interests passed to the devisee or to the remainder beneficiaries.
In a lengthy and highly procedurally grounded opinion, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals determined that the devise unambiguously covered
only the mineral estate because later language in the devise referred to a
gas well, rather than a surface interest.18 Because the court determined
the devise was unambiguous, extrinsic evidence could not be used to as-
certain the testatrix's intent. 19 Accordingly, the devisee received the min-
eral estate, and the surface estate passed to the remainder beneficiaries. 20
The court's conclusion that the devisee was open to only one construc-
tion is problematic. The court easily could have determined that the lan-
guage referring to the gas well was not an attempt by the testatrix to limit
the conveyance to the mineral estate. Significantly, the number of acres
15. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
16. See id.
17. 206 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).





mentioned in the devise (80) is closer to the true size of the surface inter-
est (77.83) than the mineral estate (85.1).
D. VOID GiF-s
Jones v. Krown2' demonstrates a significant problem that may arise if
an attorney prepares a will for a staff member's relative. In Krown, an
attorney drafted a will that named his paralegal (an independent contrac-
tor) as both a beneficiary and the executrix. After the testator died, his
sister filed a motion for a declaratory judgment to set aside the gift to the
paralegal under Texas Probate Code section 58b, which, at the time the
will was drafted, stated that a testamentary gift to an "'employee of the
attorney who prepares or supervises the preparation of the will is
void." 22 Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the paralegal's
gift was void and that the property passed via intestacy to his sister.
23
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals was unimpressed with the paralegal's
arguments that section 58b did not apply to her. That the paralegal was
not involved with the drafting of the testator's will and that she was not
present when the testator executed the will were irrelevant. 24 Addition-
ally, her technical status as an independent contractor did not keep her
from falling within the purview of the term "employee," as used in the
statute.25 Because section 58b does not define the term, the court relied
on the "plain and common meaning" of the word, defining it as an indi-
vidual who works for someone else and receives payment for that work.
26
And because the paralegal worked for the attorney and was paid for her
work, she qualified as an employee. 27 The court also explained that the
application of section 58b to void the paralegal's gift "is consistent with
the legislature's intent.., which was to avoid having an interested person
use his position of trust to benefit himself."28
Accordingly, an attorney should not draft a will which leaves property
to one of his employees unless one of the exceptions in section 58b ap-
plies. Even then, prudent practice may be to refer the employee to a
completely disinterested attorney.
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. NOTICE OF PROBATED WILL
The 2007 legislature made enormous changes to Texas Probate Code
section 128A regarding the responsibility of the personal representative
21. 218 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
22. Id. at 747 (quoting Act of May 30, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1054, § 1, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4016, 4016 (amended 2005) (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58b
(Vernon Supp. 2008)).
23. Id. at 750.
24. Id. at 748-50.
25. Id. at 749.




(both dependent and independent) to give notice to the beneficiaries
once the court has admitted the will to probate. Prior to this change, only
charitable beneficiaries were entitled to notice. 29 Now, virtually all bene-
ficiaries are entitled to notice if the testator died on or after September 1,
2007.30
1. Basic compliance rules
The personal representative must give any required notice no later
than the sixtieth day after the date of an order admitting the will to pro-
bate. 31 If the personal representative becomes aware of the identity and
address of a beneficiary after the sixty-day period, the personal represen-
tative must give notice to that beneficiary as soon as possible.
32
Unless an exception applies, the personal representative must give no-
tice to the following recipients of property named in the testator's will: a
person, an entity, the state, a governmental agency of the state, a charita-
ble organization, and a trust.33 If the beneficiary is alive on the date of
the decedent's death, it will be assumed for purposes of giving notice that
the person will outlive any survival period stated in the will.34 Thus, the
personal representative does not need to give notice to contingent or al-
ternative beneficiaries who would take if the beneficiary fails to survive.
35
The personal representative must give notice to each beneficiary whose
identity and address the personal representative knows or could ascertain
through reasonable diligence. 36 For trust beneficiaries, the personal rep-
resentative normally satisfies this duty by giving notice to the trustee.
37
However, if the personal representative is also the trustee, the personal
representative must give notice to the beneficiaries of the trust who
would be first eligible to receive the trust income if the trust were in exis-
tence (funded) on the date of the testator's death.3 8 If the beneficiary has
a court-appointed guardian or conservator, the personal representative
must give notice to that guardian or conservator.39 Similarly, if the bene-
ficiary is a minor who does not have a court appointed guardian or con-
servator, the personal representative must give notice to at least one of
the minor's parents.40 Prudent practice may be to give notice to both
parents even though it is not required. If the beneficiary is a charity that
29. See Act of May 23, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1035, § 7, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4162,
4166 (amended 2007) (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 128A (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
30. Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 801, § 1, sec. 128A, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws
1657, 1658-59 (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 128A (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
31. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 128A(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 128A(a)-(b).
34. Id. § 128A(a).
35. See id.
36. Id. § 128A(b).
37. Id. § 128A(c)(1).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 128A(c)(2).
40. Id. § 128A(c)(3).
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cannot be directly notified, the personal representative must give notice
to the attorney general.41
Certain beneficiaries are exempt from the notice requirement. A bene-
ficiary who appeared in the testator's estate proceeding before the will
was admitted to probate does not need notice because the beneficiary
obviously already knows about the probate proceeding. 42 Similarly, a
beneficiary who has already received a copy of the probated will does not
need notice if the beneficiary has "waived the right to receive notice in an
instrument that (1) acknowledges receipt of the copy of the testator's will,
(2) is signed by the beneficiary, and (3) is filed with the court. ' 43 Note
that the beneficiary's copy of the will need not be a certified copy, and
the beneficiary does not need to receive a copy of the order admitting the
will to probate.44 In addition, the waiver does not need to be acknowl-
edged; thus, the waiver does not need to be notarized. 45
The notice must contain the following: (1) the name and address of the
beneficiary and-if applicable-the name and address of the person to
whom the personal representative is giving notice, (2) the testator's
name, (3) a statement that the testator's will has been admitted to pro-
bate, (4) a statement that the beneficiary is named as a beneficiary in the
will, (5) the personal representative's name and contact information, (6) a
copy of the will admitted to probate, and (7) a copy of the order admit-
ting the will to probate.46
The personal representative must send the notice by registered or certi-
fied mail, return receipt requested. 47 No other method (e.g., hand deliv-
ery, Federal Express, or fax) is allowed.48
The personal representative must prove compliance by filing a sworn
affidavit with the clerk of the court in which the testator's estate is pend-
ing no later than the ninetieth day after the date of order admitting a will
to probate.49 Alternatively, the personal representative's attorney may
file a signed certificate. 50 The affidavit or certificate may be included
with any other pleading or document filed with the court clerk, such as
the inventory, appraisement, or list of claims. 51 Any such "coupled" fil-
ing must still comply with the timing requirement for the proof of
notice.52
41. Id. § 128A(c)(4).
42. See id. § 128A(d)(1).
43. Id. § 128A(d)(2).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. § 128A(e).
47. Id. § 128A(f).
48. See id.
49. ld. § 128A(g).
50. Id.





The new notice duties will increase the time and monetary costs for
many probates in Texas. Ostensibly, the reasoning is that this increased
cost and inconvenience will help protect beneficiaries from unscrupulous
personal representatives who probate wills and then use estate funds for
their own unauthorized purposes.
These new duties create problems for wills that designate beneficiaries
by class, such as "my children" or "my grandchildren." The new law re-
quires the personal representative to give notice to "each beneficiary
named in the will."' 53 Thus, whether class gift members are "named" so
that they are entitled to notice is uncertain. Later in the same provision,
however, the personal representative is required to ascertain the "iden-
tity" of the beneficiaries.54 One could argue that the personal representa-
tive must use reasonable diligence to ascertain the membership of class
gifts and provide them notice. Despite the ambiguity in the statute, the
prudent practice is to give notice to ascertainable class gift members.
While the personal representative must use "reasonable diligence" to
ascertain the identity and address of each beneficiary, the statute lacks
guidance regarding what actions constitute reasonable diligence.55 The
personal representative should probably ask other beneficiaries, look in
the telephone book, and use an Internet search engine to ascertain the
beneficiaries. Whether the personal representative needs to take further
actions, such as hiring a private investigator, remains uncertain.
The personal representative must give notice to beneficiaries even if
they are only receiving nominal gifts. Thus, the cost of giving notice
could be greater than the value of a gift.
If the personal representative is also a beneficiary, as is often the case,
the personal representative must either give him-/herself notice or file a
waiver.56 Although this seems ridiculous, the statute contains no excep-
tion for gifts to the personal representative. 57
A court-appointed personal representative also has a duty to give no-
tice. When a will is probated as a muniment of title, the court does not
appoint a personal representative. 58 Accordingly, the notice duties do
not apply when a will is probated as a muniment of title.
B. LoST WILLS
Controversy exists regarding whether a copy of a lost will is sufficient
to prove its contents. Until amended by the 2007 legislature, the statute
provided that the contents must be proved "by the testimony of a credi-
53. Id. § 128A(b).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. § 128A.
57. See id.
58. In re Estate of Kurtz, 54 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
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ble witness who has read [the original] or heard it read. ' 59 Several recent
cases focused on this issue and reached differing results. 60
The addition of a supposed third method of proof to Texas Probate
Code section 85 by the 2007 legislature, namely proof by identification of
a copy, does not appear to actually add a new method because of the
difficulty of a person testifying that the document is "a copy of the will" if
the person never read the original or heard the original read.61 .
C. QUALIFIED COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATION ABOLISHED
The qualified community administration procedure under Texas Pro-
bate Code sections 161-167 and 169-175 was used when someone besides
the surviving spouse had an interest in the community property (for ex-
ample, when the deceased spouse has descendants who are not also the
descendants of the surviving spouse). 62 The procedure was available if
the will named no executor, the named executor failed to serve, or the
decedent died intestate.63 The surviving spouse obtained powers akin to
those of an independent executor but only with respect to community
property. 64 In many ways, the procedure was a "mini" independent ad-
ministration because the surviving spouse had to formally qualify, com-
plete an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims, et cetera.
The 2007 legislature completely abolished this procedure. 65 The under-
lying reason appears to be that the procedure was not frequently used,
and thus, there was no reason to retain it.
D. SALE OF REAL PROPERTY IN DEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION
The 2007 legislature simplified the process of selling real property in a
dependent administration. 66 This new procedure operates as follows.
59. Act of Mar. 16, 1955, 54th Leg., R.S., ch. 55, § 85, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 88, 116-17(amended 2007) (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 85 (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
60. Compare Garton v. Rockett, 190 S.W.3d 139, 145-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding copy insufficient), with In re Estate of Jones, 197 S.W.3d 894,
902-03 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, pet. denied) (holding copy sufficient); see generally
Charles M. Davis, A Lost Will, a Photocopy of the Original, and Two "Snakes in the Grass":
Is It Time to Update Section 85 of the Texas Probate Code?, 40 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 89
(2007) (discussing the problems with lost wills).
61. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 85 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
62. See Act of May 5, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 173, §§ 11-13, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 967,
980-983, repealed by Act of May 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 301, § 7, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws
575, 577.
63. See Act of May 5, 1971, 62a Leg., R.S., ch. 173, § 11, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 967, 980-
82 (repealed 2007).
64. See Act of May 5,1971, 62a Leg., R.S., ch. 173, § 13, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 967, 982-
83 (repealed 2007).
65. See Act of May 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 301, § 7, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 575,
577.
66. Probate Code section 343 (setting of hearing on application) was repealed, Probate
Code section 345A was added, and conforming amendments were made to Probate Code
sections 344 (citation and return on application), 345 (opposition to application), and 346(order of sale). Act of May 15 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, §§ 9.01-.05, 2007 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4000, 4008.
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The citation that is issued after the personal representative applies to sell
real property must inform the recipients of their right to file an opposi-
tion to the sale during a period of time set by the court. 67 If an opposi-
tion is not filed in a timely manner, then a hearing on the application to
sell real property is not required; however, the court has discretion to
require a hearing even if an opposition was not filed. 68 If an interested
person files a timely opposition to the application to sell real property,
the clerk must immediately notify the judge about the opposition.69 The
court is then required to hold a hearing on the application.
70
If the court orders a hearing, it must designate in writing a date and
time to hear the application and the opposition, if any.7 1 The clerk must
issue a notice that provides the date and time of the hearing to the appli-
cant and to each person who filed an opposition to the sale.
72
E. BUSINESS OPERATION IN DEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION
Texas Probate Code section 238 has been substantially modernized to
make it easier for a dependent personal representative to run the dece-
dent's business, farm, ranch, or factory without the necessity of obtaining
court permission for every action.73 Under section 238, the court may
grant the dependent personal representative the powers to operate the
decedent's business only if: (1) all interested persons receive notice, (2)
the court conducts a hearing, (3) the business was not specifically gifted in
the decedent's will, (4) it is not necessary to sell the business to pay debts
or for other lawful purposes, and (5) the court determines that it is in the
best interest of the estate for the personal representative to operate the
business.74 Before granting any powers, the court must consider (1) the
condition of the estate and the business, (2) the necessity that may exist
in the future to sell the business or its assets to pay debts, claims, or other
lawful estate expenditures, (3) the effect of the order on the speedy set-
tlement of the estate, and (4) the best interests of the estate.75
If the court allows the personal representative to operate the business,
the personal representative will receive the powers that a dependent per-
sonal representative may traditionally exercise without court order under
Texas Probate Code section 234(b) unless the court specifically limits
those powers.76 The personal representative also receives whichever of
the following powers the court specifically grants: (1) "the power to hire,
67. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 344 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
68. Id. § 345A(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
69. Id. § 345A(a).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 345A(c).
72. Id. "The judge may, by entries on the docket, continue a hearing ... from time to
time until the judge is satisfied concerning the application." Id. § 345A(d).
73. See Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 668, § 1, sec. 238, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws
1244, 1244-46 (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 238 (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
74. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 238(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
75. Id. § 238(f).
76. Id. § 238(c).
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pay, and terminate" the business's employees; (2) "the power to incur
debt on behalf of the business" and to secure that debt by liens against
business assets or the estate; (3) the power to purchase and sell property
in the ordinary course of the business's operation, including purchasing
and selling real property if the court finds that the business's principal
purpose is the purchase and sale of real property; (4) the power to enter
into leases or contracts-including those that may extend beyond the set-
tlement of the estate if doing so appears consistent with the speedy settle-
ment of the estate; and (5) any other power the court finds necessary to
operate the business.7 7 If the order grants the personal representative the
power to purchase, sell, lease, or otherwise encumber real or personal
property, the order governs such action and the personal representative
does not need to comply with other Texas Probate Code provisions re-
garding the purchase, sale, lease, or encumbrance of estate property, in-
cluding provisions requiring citation or notice. 78
A personal representative who obtains an order to operate the dece-
dent's business has all of the same fiduciary duties as a personal represen-
tative who does not operate a business that is part of the estate.7 9 In
operating the business, the personal representative must consider: (1)
"the condition of the estate and the business;" (2) "the necessity that may
exist in the future to sell the business or its assets to pay debts, claims, or
other lawful estate expenditures;" (3) the effect of the order on the
speedy settlement of the estate;" and (4) "the best interests of the es-
tate."80 In addition, the personal representative must: (1) report to the
court the condition and operation of the business as part of the normal
annual and final accountings unless the court orders more frequent re-
ports or a different type of report; and (2) file a notice in the real prop-
erty records of the county in which the real property is located prior to
purchasing, selling, leasing, or otherwise encumbering any real property
of the business. 81
A third party who deals in good faith with a personal representative
with respect to a transaction involving a purchase, sale, lease or other
encumbrance of real property of a business may rely on the notice that
the personal representative must file, as well as any order entered under
Texas Probate Code section 238 and filed as part of the estate records
maintained by the clerk of the court in which the estate is pending.82
F. ACCELERATION OF CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
If a person owing child support dies before the child support obligation
terminates, the remaining unpaid balance of the child support obligation
77. Id. § 238(d).
78. Id. § 238(e).
79. Id. § 238(g).
80. Id. § 238(g)(1).
81. Id. § 238(g)(2)-(h).
82. Id. § 238(i).
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becomes payable on the date of the person's death.83 The claim falls
within "Class 4" under Texas Probate Code section 322.84
1. Determination of Amount
The family court (not the probate court) must determine the amount of
the unpaid child support by applying the following factors: (1) the present
value of the total amount of child support payments that would have be-
come due between the month the decedent died and the month the child
turns eighteen, (2) the present value of the total amount of health insur-
ance premiums payable for the child's benefit from the month the dece-
dent died until the month the child turns eighteen, (3) any enhancements
of support provided by Family Code 154.306 if the decedent owed sup-
port for a disabled minor or adult child, (4) the nature and amount of any
benefit to which the child may be entitled because of the decedent's
death, such as life insurance proceeds, annuity payments, social security
death benefits, trust distributions, and retirement survivor benefits, and
(5) "any other financial resources available for the support of the
child.",85
If the court finds that the child support obligation has not been satis-
fied, the court must render a judgment in favor of the obligee, for the
benefit of the child, in the amount of the unpaid child support.8 6 This




Although public policy seemingly supports this new statute, it is none-
theless fraught with potential problems. First, this statute may result in a
child who is entitled to child support receiving a better deal (that is, a
windfall) when compared to a child whom the decedent was supporting
but who was not receiving child support. For example, assume that
Mother has two children, A and B. Child A lives with her father and
Mother pays child support. Child B lives with Mother. Mother dies un-
married and intestate. The father will have a claim against Mother's es-
tate for the present value of the future child support. After paying this
claim and her other creditors, Mother's remaining property, if any, is split
equally between Child A and Child B. As a result, Child B is in a com-
paratively worse position because of the accelerated amount of child sup-
port for Child A.
In addition, the statute lacks a provision for refunding the decedent's
estate if the child dies before reaching age eighteen. Thus, the custodial
parent may receive a considerable windfall upon the child's death.
83. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.015(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
84. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
85. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.015(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
86. Id. § 154.015(d).
87. Id. § 154.015(e).
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Finally, the custodial parent receives a lump sum and may be tempted
to misuse the funds. For example, the parent could spend the money im-
mediately rather than prudently investing it for the child and allocating
just enough each month to substitute for the child support payment.
G. WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT CLAIMS
In State v. Oakley,88 the Texas Supreme Court noted that Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 103.154(b) expressly provides for
the nonsurvival of a decedent's wrongful imprisonment claim against the
state. Thus, upon the wrongfully imprisoned person's death, the unpaid
amounts are credited to the state and may not be paid to the person's
heirs, beneficiaries, or estate. 89 The court then held that because the
claim did not survive, it was also unassignable during life. 90 Conse-
quently, a person who is wrongfully imprisoned should collect all monies
due from the state as soon as possible because any amount that is unpaid
at the time of death will be forfeited.
H. PRO SE
In a disturbing opinion, the Waco Court of Appeals in Steele v. McDon-
aid,91 required all court appearances and filings by an independent per-
sonal representative to be made by a licensed attorney. In this case, the
independent executor discharged his attorney and proceeded pro se. The
court determined the independent executor was precluded from doing so
because he was not a licensed attorney.92 The court explained that only a
licensed attorney may appear in court because the executor is litigating
rights in a representative capacity.93
A well-reasoned dissent strongly disagreed. 94 Generally, an indepen-
dent executor may do anything the decedent could have done if he were
still alive.95 Thus, it should follow that the executor may appear pro se
regarding estate matters. 96 The judge explained that "[a]ll over Texas es-
tates are being probated, inventories prepared and filed, and estates be-
ing closed without an attorney being involved. ' 97 If the majority's
opinion is correct, all of this conduct must cease, thereby drastically re-
ducing the effectiveness and efficiency of the independent administration
system. 98 Should this case be left to stand, October 18, 2006, may well be
remembered as the day the Texas independent administration system be-
88. 227 S.W.3d 58, 60 (Tex. 2007).
89. Id. at 60 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.154(b) (Vernon 2005)).
90. Id. at 60-62.
91. 202 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
92. Id. at 928.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 930-31 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 930.






In a certified question of first impression from a bankruptcy case pend-
ing in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Texas
Supreme Court determined, in Norris v. Thomas,100 by a five-to-four de-
cision, that a boat does not qualify as a homestead under article XVI,
sections 50-51 of the Texas Constitution. Although the boat was used as
the claimant's primary residence and otherwise satisfied the requirements
of a homestead, it could not qualify for homestead protection because it
was not attached to land. In the supreme court's words:
In order to qualify as a homestead, a residence must rest on the land
and have a requisite degree of physical permanency, immobility, and
attachment to fixed realty. A dock-based umbilical cord providing
water, electricity, and phone service may help make a boat habitable,
but the attachment to land is too slight to warrant homestead
protection.101
Accordingly, the surviving spouse and minor children of a decedent
whose primary residence is a boat will not be able to claim homestead
rights such as the right to occupy the homestead until death, reaching age
of majority, or abandonment. Likewise, the floating home will not be
protected from the estate's general creditors.
IV. TRUSTS
A. TRUSTEE's DUTY TO KEEP BENEFICIARY INFORMED
The 2007 legislature made changes to the trustee's duty to keep the
beneficiaries informed of the trust and its activities. To put the changes
into perspective, it is important to appreciate how this duty has been
treated in the past under Texas law.
1. Prior to January 1, 2006
Prior to January 1, 2006, trustees had a duty to disclose information to
the beneficiaries either (1) upon request or (2) if the trustee was going to
take some material and unusual action.102 The existence of this duty was
well accepted and did not cause significant problems for trustees.
99. See generally Michael Hatfield, Pro Se Executors-Unauthorized Practice of Law,
or Not?, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 329, 338 (2007) (providing a detailed discussion of this case
and discussing the overarching issue of proceeding pro se in estate administrations).
100. 215 S.W.3d 851, 852 (Tex. 2007).
101. Id. at 859.
102. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.151 (Vernon 2007) (detailing beneficiary's right
to an accounting); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. 1984) ("[Trustees
have a] duty of full disclosure of all material facts ... that might affect [a beneficiary's]
rights.").
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2. January 1, 2006 through June 15, 2007
The 2005 legislature codified the duty to keep the beneficiary informed
when it enacted Texas Trust Code section 113.060.103 This section pro-
vided that the trustee had a duty to keep the beneficiaries reasonably
informed regarding (1) trust administration and (2) the material facts
necessary for the beneficiaries to protect their interests.1 0 4 At the same
time, the legislature enacted Texas Trust Code section 111.0035(b)(5)(C)
which authorized the settlor to limit this duty, but only if either (1) the
beneficiary was under age twenty-five, or (2) the beneficiary was not eli-
gible for current distribution or for a distribution if the trust were to ter-
minate now.1 0 5
The codification of the duty to inform raised significant concerns for
trustees, including (1) the meaning of the term "reasonably" and (2)
whether the beneficiaries needed to be told about all trustee actions, even
day-to-day activities, because notice of virtually all actions may be neces-
sary if the beneficiaries want to protect their interests. These problems
and others were triggered by the way the legislature carved section
113.060, a very short and undetailed provision, out of Uniform Trust
Code section 813, which includes an extensive explanation of the duty
and how it may be satisfied. 10 6
3. Starting June 15, 2007
The 2007 legislature repealed the statutory duty in Texas Trust Code
section 113.060 and restored the common law duty.1 0 7 But under new
Texas Trust Code section 111.0035(c), the settlor may limit the duty to
keep the beneficiary informed if (1) the trust is revocable, (2) the benefi-
ciary is under age twenty-five, or (3) the beneficiary is not eligible for




In the words of Glenn Karisch, the time has come for the "mother of
all disclosures" so that a trustee may gain maximum protection for the
potential enhanced duty to disclose that existed during the seventeen and
103. Act of May 12, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 148, § 15, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 287, 292,
repealed by Act of May 11, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 451, § 21, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 801,
808.
104. Id.
105. Act of May 12, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 148, § 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 287, 287-88(amended 2007) (current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035 (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
106. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813, 7C U.L.A. 609 (2006).
107. Act of May 11, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 451, §§ 21-22, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 801,
808 ("The common-law duty to keep a beneficiary informed that existed immediately
before January 1, 2006, is continued in effect.").
108. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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a half month window. 10 9 He also recommends disclosing "everything the
trustee can think of to disclose, and disclose it to every beneficiary [who]
can be located, regardless of remoteness." 0 By doing so, the trustee will
lessen the chance of being removed by the court and delaying the start of
the running of statutes of limitations, which begins upon full disclosure."'
B. SELF-DEALING WAIVERS FOR CORPORATE TRUSTEES
Under prior law, settlors and beneficiaries were prohibited from waiv-
ing or approving certain self-dealing conduct of corporate trustees such as
purchasing trust property for themselves, selling their own property to
the trust, and borrowing funds from the trust." 2 The 2007 legislature re-
moved these restrictions, and thus, settlors and beneficiaries may now
waive these duties for both individual and corporate trustees."
13
C. TERMINATION OF UNECONOMIC TRUST
Under new Texas Trust Code section 112.059, the trustee may termi-
nate an uneconomic trust under certain conditions. 1 4 First, a trustee
must give notice to (a) the current or permissible distributees of trust
income or principal and (b) the future distributees or permissible distrib-
utees if the trust were to terminate with no powers of appointment being
exercised."l 5 Second, the total value of trust property must be less than
$50,000.116 Third, after considering the purpose of the trust and the na-
ture of the trust property, the trustee must conclude that the value of the
trust property is insufficient to justify the continued cost of administra-
tion. 1 7 Fourth, the trustee's power to terminate the trust must not cause
the trust assets to be included in the trustee's estate for federal estate tax
purposes." 8 And fifth, the trust must not involve an easement for con-
servation or preservation.' 1 9 When the trust terminates, the trustee must
distribute the property "in a manner consistent with the purposes of the
trust."12
0
109. Glenn M. Karisch, 2007 Legislative Update: Summary of Changes Affecting Pro-




112. Act of May 12, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 148, § 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 287, re-
pealed by Act of May 16, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 451, §2, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 801, 801;
Act of May 5, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 657, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3332, 3374, repealed
by Act of May 16, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 451, §8, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 801, 803.
113. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 111.0035, 114.005 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
114. See id. § 112.059.
115. Id. § 112.059(a).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 112.059(c).
119. Id. § 112.059(d).
120. Id. § 112.059(b).
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D. BOND
The 2007 legislature made several important changes to the rules gov-
erning the bonding of trustees.121 First, the court may no longer waive
bond if the settlor did not waive bond in the trust.122 Second, the court
may, for cause shown, require a noncorporate trustee to post bond even if
the settlor waived bond in the trust. 123 Third, the court may order the
bond to be payable to the trust estate or the registry of the court as well
as the beneficiaries. 124 And fourth, an interested party may bring an ac-
tion to require a bond, not just to increase or decrease the amount of an
existing bond.125
E. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
A settlor creating a support trust must make extremely clear the stan-
dard of living that the trust is to support and whether distributions from a
support trust are for the "first" or "last" dollars of support. The impor-
tance of doing so is reflected in Keisling v. Landrum,126 a case in which a
husband established a testamentary trust for his wife under which she
would receive distributions only if her "own income and other financial
resources from sources other than from this trust are not sufficient" to
maintain her in the standing of living that they had while married. Be-
cause the trustee had made no distributions, the wife filed suit claiming
that "other financial resources" referred only to income, thereby requir-
ing the trustee to distribute trust income to her as soon as her own in-
come could not support her standard of living. The trustee asserted that
other financial resources meant assets as well as income and that the wife
must exhaust all of her assets, except for one house and one vehicle,
before being entitled to distributions from the trust. The trial court held
in favor of the trustee and the wife appealed. 127
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed by agreeing with the wife
that the trust did not demonstrate that her husband "intended the trust to
be a parachute to protect [her] from poverty after she had exhausted all
of her own assets. '128 Instead, the court concluded that the trust's pur-
pose was to "step in and pay for [her] high standard of living," such as
multiple homes, vehicles, cruises, gifts to others, shopping, and maid ser-
vice.129 The court noted that it would be "nonsensical to require [the
wife] to sell all of her vehicles and other assets ... just so the trust could
'step in' and provide her with funds to purchase new assets and vehicles
121. See Act of May 16, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 451, § 6, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 801,803(current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.058 (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
122. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.058(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
123. Id. § 113.058(d).
124. Id. § 113.058(b)(1).
125. Id. § 113.058(d).
126. 218 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
127. Id. at 739.




to replace them. ' 130 The court held that the husband's will was unambig-
uous and then adopted the language of Restatement (Third) of Trusts
that the term other financial resources refers only to "'income and other
periodic receipts, such as pension or other annuity payments and court-
ordered support payments.'"131
The court recognized, however, that the trustee also "has a competing
responsibility to manage the trust prudently and responsibly to preserve
it for her future support and maintenance. 1 132 Thus, the trustee was not
required to give in to the wife's every request but must distribute for her
maintenance and support. The court explained that "[b]ecause the trust's
purpose is to provide for [her] high standard of living both now and in the
future, [the trustee] is required to use his discretion in distributing funds
so that the trust is not depleted rapidly and wastefully. 1 33 The appellate
court did not, however, determine the size of any distribution to the wife
but instead concluded that "the trial court must now determine what [the
wife's] standard of living was then make trust distributions to compensate
[her] from the date of [her husband's] death. 1 34
F. STANDING OF CONTINGENT BENEFICIARY OF REVOCABLE TRUST
Even if the trustee and the settlor with the power to revoke are the
same person, all changes to trust agreements should be in writing to avoid
later disputes such as that in Moon v. Lesikar.135 In Moon, a father cre-
ated a trust, named himself and his son as the initial trustees, indicated
that he could revoke or amend by giving written notice to the trustee, and
named himself as the sole beneficiary during his life. Many transactions
subsequently occurred, including a sale of trust property to his son at a
price considerably below market value. His daughter (a remainder bene-
ficiary of the trust) claimed that this sale was in breach of duty. The trial
court disagreed and rendered a summary judgment in favor of the son.136
Upon the daughter's appeal, the Fourteenth District Houston Court of
Appeals affirmed by holding that the daughter had no standing to com-
plain about the sale.137 The court acknowledged that normally a benefici-
ary is an interested person under Texas Trust Code section 111.004(7) and
thus would have standing to bring an action under Texas Trust Code sec-
tion 115.001.138 In this case, however, the daughter, a mere contingent
beneficiary, was complaining about a transaction made by the settlor of a
revocable trust.139 Recognizing this as a matter of first impression in
130. Id.
131. Id. at 743 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. e(2) (2003)).
132. Id. at 743 (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 744.
134. Id. at 745.
135. 230 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
136. Id. at 802.
137. Id. at 806.




Texas, the court examined cases from other jurisdictions.' 40 This exami-
nation led the court to conclude that because the father was both the
settlor and the trustee with full power to revoke the trust, the vesting of
the daughter's contingent interest was subject to the father's discretion
until his death.14'
The daughter also claimed that her father's revocation did not comply
with Texas Trust Code section 112.051(c) because it was not in writing.
The court held that conveying the property out of the trust was a clear
indication of her father's intent to revoke and that he was not required to
give himself written notice of the revocation.1 42 In so holding, the court
explained that it would be absurd to require the father (as the settlor) to
send himself (as the trustee) a letter stating that he is revoking a portion
of the trust.143
G. PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES DEALING WITH TRUSTEE
The 2007 legislature overhauled the provisions that protect third par-
ties who deal with trustees by amending Texas Trust Code section
114.081. Under the amended section, a person who deals with a trustee is
not liable to the trustee or the beneficiaries if the trustee exceeded the
scope of the trustee's authority in dealing with the person, provided that
(1) the person deals with the trustee in good faith and (2) the trust re-
ceives fair value. 144 Likewise, a person who acts in good faith in deliver-
ing money or other assets to a trustee is not required to ensure that the
trustee properly uses the money or other assets.145
A non-beneficiary who deals with the trustee is not required to inquire
into the extent of the trustee's powers or the propriety of the trustee's
exercise of those powers if the person (1) deals with the trustee in good
faith and (2) obtains a copy of the trust instrument or a "certification of
trust. '146 In addition, a non-beneficiary who assists an ex-trustee or deals
with an ex-trustee for value is protected from liability just as if the ex-
trustee were still in office as long as the non-beneficiary acted in good
faith and without knowledge that the trusteeship had ended. 147
140. Id. at 803-05.
141. Id. at 804.
142. Id. at 805-06.
143. Id. at 806.
144. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.081(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
145. Id. § 114.081(c).
146. Id. § 114.081(b). When a non-beneficiary asks for a copy of the trust, the trustee
now has the option of providing a "certification of trust" rather than the trust instrument.
See id. § 114.086. This new provision enhances the privacy of the terms of inter vivos
trusts.
147. Id. § 114.081(d).
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V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS
In a landmark decision, the Texas Supreme Court permitted extrinsic
evidence to be used to show the depositor's intent to create survivorship
rights in a multiple-party account in an action against the financial institu-
tion even though current law prohibited a claimant from establishing, the
survivorship feature by extrinsic evidence to claim the account funds
themselves. In A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Beyer,148 a father and his
daughter established a joint account with rights of survivorship. For tax
reasons, the account was converted into a single-party account in father's
name. Later, the father told the broker over the telephone that he
wanted his daughter's name added back to the account. The broker pre-
pared documents reflecting the change and delivered them to the daugh-
ter who then gave them to her father. The father signed them, and the
daughter left the documents with the broker's receptionist. Later, the
broker could not locate the new joint-account agreement, despite a dili-
gent search. Before the father could sign a replacement joint-account
agreement, he lapsed into a coma and died. A dispute arose over
whether the balance of the funds in the account (over $1 million) be-
longed to the daughter or passed to the father's six children by intestacy.
The daughter settled the dispute with her siblings by agreeing to share the
account equally with them.
The daughter then sued the brokerage firm for the difference between
the balance in the account and the one-sixth share she received. The jury
determined the firm was liable under six theories; the daughter elected to
recover under the contract claim.1 49 The firm appealed, and after the
intermediate appellate court affirmed, the firm appealed to the Texas Su-
preme Court. 150
The supreme court affirmed, rejecting the firm's argument that the trial
court improperly admitted extrinsic evidence of the father's intent for the
account to have the survivorship feature.151 The court recognized that
Texas courts consistently hold that in the absence of a written agreement
described in Texas Probate Code section 439(a), extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible to prove rights of survivorship against the depositor's es-
tate. 52 The daughter, however, was not seeking a recovery from her fa-
ther's estate or against a party to the joint account. 153 Instead, she was
attempting to recover from the brokerage firm for losing the survivorship
agreement-a loss that caused the firm to breach its contract to create a
148. 235 S.W.3d 704. 7-6 (Tex. 2007) (respondent is not related to the author of this
article).
149. Id. at 707.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 708, 710.




joint account with rights of survivorship. 154
B. SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Survivorship agreements involving community property must comply
with Probate Code section 452 such that they must be (1) in writing, (2)
signed by both spouses, and (3) contain express survivorship language. 55
Beatty v. Holmes156 explains that a mere indication of the survivorship
feature on a stock certificate is insufficient. In this case, a husband and
his wife held community property securities with the notation "JT TEN,"
defined on the back of the certificates as "joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship and not as tenancy in common." Neither spouse signed the cer-
tificates. Although the probate court held that this was sufficient to
create the survivorship feature, the appellate court reversed. 157
After discussing the complex procedural background of the case, the
Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals concluded that Texas Pro-
bate Code section 450 provided the only ground upon which the probate
court could have granted a summary judgment that the securities had the
survivorship feature. 158 The appellate court then rejected the argument
that the lack of a signature requirement in section 450 indicates that the
certificates had the survivorship feature.1 59 The appellate court held that
since the securities are community property, the survivorship feature
must be created under Texas Probate Code section 452, which requires
that both spouses sign the survivorship agreement. 160 Because both
spouses had not signed such an agreement, the securities lacked the survi-
vorship feature despite the language contained on the certificates.' 61
In reaching this decision, the court recognized that the interplay be-
tween section 452 (requiring signatures) and section 450 (requiring no
signatures) had not been addressed by a Texas court. 62 The court ex-
plained that when section 450 was enacted in 1979, spouses could not yet
hold community property in survivorship form; that legal relationship was
not allowed until the passage of a constitutional amendment in 1987.163
Thus, the legislature could not have intended section 450 to provide a
method for spouses to create survivorship rights in community prop-
erty.164 Accordingly, section 450 authorizes "pay on death" type provi-
sions, not the creation of survivorship rights in community property.
154. Id.
155. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 452 (Vernon 2003)
156. 233 S.W.3d 475, 494 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. filed); see also
Holmes v. Beatty, 233 S.W.3d 494, 501-02 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.
filed).
157. Beatty, 233 S.W.3d at 477.
158. Id. at 485.
159. Id. at 489-90.
160. Id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 451-52 (Vernon 2003)).
161. See id.
162. Id. at 487.
163. Id. at 487-88.
164. Id. at 488.
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C. POWER OF ATTORNEY
Armstrong v. Roberts165 teaches an important lesson to individuals pre-
paring a power of attorney: Agents lack the authority to name pay on
death payees unless such authority is expressly granted. In Armstrong, a
father named his daughter as his agent under a non-statutory power of
attorney. Using this authority, the daughter opened three pay-on-death
certificates of deposit naming various individuals, including herself, as the
pay-on-death payees. The El Paso Court of Appeals concluded that the
daughter had the authority to open the certificates of deposit because the
power of attorney granted her broad and unlimited powers, such as the
power "to do ... any and all acts ... as [the father] might or could do if
personally present. ' '166
However, the court held that the daughter did not have the authority to
designate the pay on death payees. 167 The court relied on Texas Probate
Code section 439(b), which states that a pay on death account requires a
written agreement "signed by the original payee. 1 68 Because the father
did not sign the agreement, the daughter's designations were
ineffective. 169
D. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF ESTATE ATTORNEY
An attorney must take great care when representing parties with po-
tential conflicts of interest, such as a personal representative and the ben-
eficiaries. Even when the attorneys involved have the parties sign
comprehensive consents, the possibility of litigation-especially by subse-
quent representatives of the parties-still exists, as demonstrated by
Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. Cailloux.170 In this case, a husband and his wife
hired a law firm to plan their multi-million dollar estate, but the husband
died before completion of this plan. On the advice of the law firm, the
wife disclaimed her right to her share of the husband's community prop-
erty, thereby resulting in this property vesting in charities that the hus-
band had designated in his will. Over six years later and after the wife
had become incapacitated, her son sued the law firm for breach of fiduci-
ary duty by claiming that the firm and a bank did not fully and fairly
disclose the impact of the disclaimer. The jury found that the firm, the
bank, and the attorneys had breached their fiduciary duties but that the
wife had no damages.171 Nonetheless, the trial court created an "equita-
ble trust" for $65.5 million to be funded by the firm and the bank. 172
The law firm and bank appealed, and the San Antonio Court of Ap-
165. 211 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, pet. denied).
166. Id. at 870-71.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 870-71 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(b) (Vernon 2003)).
169. Id. at 871.
170. 224 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
171. Id. at 732-33.
172. Id. at 733.
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peals reversed. 173 The court carefully examined the conduct of the law
firm, the bank, and the individual attorneys involved. In doing so, it rec-
ognized the potential conflicts of interest between the parties (the per-
sonal representative of the husband's estate and the beneficiaries) but
agreed with appellant's argument that they had adequately notified the
parties of the conflicts and that the parties had consented to the joint
representation. 174 The court discerned no evidence that any of the al-
leged breaches of duty caused the wife's disclaimer.1 75
The appellate court also held that even if the law firm and the bank had
breached their duties, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an
"equitable trust. ' 176 The appellate court treated this remedy as a con-
structive trust and explained that the requirements of a constructive trust
had not been proven. 177 For example, there was no evidence that the
firm or the bank held legal title to any of the assets that the wife dis-
claimed. 178 In addition, this trust would have placed the wife in a better
position than if the wife had not executed the disclaimer.1 79
E. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
The 2007 legislature added Texas Probate Code section 47A to author-
ize a court, under certain circumstances, to deem a decedent's current
marriage void for lack of mental capacity even after the decedent has
died.' 80 This section was designed to "undo" marriages entered into due
to the actions of conniving and abusive caregivers.
If a family code proceeding to void a marriage based on lack of mental
capacity is pending at the time of death (or if the court has been asked to
do so in a pending guardianship proceeding), the court may declare the
marriage void despite the death of the decedent. 18' In doing so, the court
must apply the same standards as for an annulment under the Texas Fam-
ily Code. 182
If a proceeding to void a marriage based on lack of mental capacity is
not pending at the time of death, the court may nonetheless deem the
marriage void if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the decedent
entered into the marriage within three years of the decedent's death, (2)
an interested person files an application to void the marriage on the basis
173. Id. at 738.
174. Id. 735-36.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 736.
177. Id. at 736-37.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 737-38.
180. Act of May 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 4.01, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4000,
4003-04 (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47A (Vernon Supp. 2008)) (applying
not only to a decedent who dies on or after September 1, 2007, but also to decedents who
died earlier if the probate or administration is pending on September 1, 2007 or is com-
menced on or after September 1, 2007).




of lack of mental capacity within one year of the decedent's death, (3) the
court finds that the decedent lacked the mental capacity to consent to the
marriage and understand the nature of any marriage ceremony that might
have occurred, and (4) the court does not determine that after the date of
the marriage, the decedent "gained the mental capacity to recognize the
marriage relationship" and actually recognized the relationship. 183
If the marriage is deemed void, the surviving partner of the void mar-
riage is not considered the decedent's surviving spouse for any purpose
under Texas law.184 For example, the surviving partner would not be able
to receive an intestate share of the estate or claim homestead rights.
F. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Individuals entering into agreements to settle property matters in a di-
vorce action should include a clear provision addressing what should hap-
pen if one or both parties dies between the date the agreement is signed
and the date the divorce is finalized. The case of Spiegel v. KLRU En-
dowment Fund'85 is instructive on this issue. While a husband and his
wife were in the process of divorcing, they entered into a mediated settle-
ment agreement which allocated community property, accounts, life in-
surance, and other property. One day before the hearing to finalize the
divorce, the wife died. The trial court held that the agreement was en-
forceable even though it was never incorporated into a valid divorce
decree. 186
The husband appealed, but the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed. 187
The court recognized this issue as one of first impression in Texas and
held that the agreement was "enforceable on the plain language of the
statute and the public policy underlying it, as well as the parties' intent as
expressed in the language of the agreement. ' 188 In so holding, the court
determined that the agreement was sufficient to revoke the beneficiary
designations in the husband's favor regarding nonprobate assets in his
wife's estate, such as life insurance and retirement plans. 189
The appellate court rejected the husband's claim that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over nonprobate assets and that the mediated settle-
ment agreement did not extend to beneficial interests.1 90 Recognizing a
split of authority, the court held that the better view was that the alloca-
tion of nonprobate assets to one spouse (as that spouse's separate prop-
erty) acts to revoke a beneficiary designation of the asset in favor of the
other spouse because individuals who are divorcing intend to revoke ben-
eficiary designations in favor of the soon-to-be ex-spouse-unless there is
183. Id. § 47A(b)-(e).
184. Id. § 47A(f).
185. 228 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).
186. Id. at 239.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 241.
189. Id. at 241-43.
190. Id. at 244.
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express language to the contrary. 91
G. UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS AcT
The 2007 legislature enacted the Uniform Prudent Management of In-
stitutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) replacing the Uniform Management of
Institutional Funds Act passed in 1989.192 UPMIFA provides statutory
guidelines for the management, investment, and expenditure of endow-
ment funds held by charitable institutions.' 93 It expressly provides for
diversification of assets, pooling of assets, and total portfolio manage-
ment.194 This brings the law governing charitable institutions in line with
modern investment and expenditure practice as done in the trust context
by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.
191. Id. at 245.
192. Act May 25, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 834, § 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1729, 1729-36
(current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 163.001-.011 (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
193. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 163.001-.011 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
194. See id. § 163.004(e)(4).
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